Stable model semantics has become a very popular approach for the management of negation in logic programming. This approach relies mainly on the closed world assumption to complete the available knowledge and its formulation has its basis in the so-called Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation.
Introduction
Stable model semantics [25, 26] is probably the most widely studied and most commonly accepted approach adopted to give meaning to logic programs (with negation). Informally, it consists in relying on the Closed World Assumption (CWA) to complete the available knowledge {CWA assumes that all atoms not entailed by a program are false, see [45] , and is motivated by the fact that explicit representation of negative information in logic programs is not feasible since the addition of explicit negative information could overwhelm a system. De ning default rules which allow implicit inference of negated facts from positive information encoded in a logic program has been an attractive alternative to the explicit representation approach.
Stable model semantics de nes a whole family of models of (or 'answers to') a logic program and, remarkably, one of these stable models, the minimal one according to 'knowledge or information ordering', is taken as the favorite (e.g. see [12, 13, 44] ) and is one-to-one related with the so-called well-founded semantics [48, 49] .
The original formulation of stable model semantics was classical, two-valued, over the set of truth-values ff; tg. But, some programs have no stable model under this setting. To overcome this problem, Przymusinski [42, 43, 44] extended the notion of stable model semantics to allow three-valued, or partial, stable model semantics. Remarkably, three-valued logics has also been considered in other approaches for providing semantics to logic programs, such as e.g. in [22, 29] where Clark's completion is extended to three-valued logics, yielding the well-known Kripke-Kleene semantics of logic programs. In three-valued semantics, the set of truth values is ff; t; ?g, where ? stands for unknown. Przymusinski showed that every program has at least a partial stable model and that the well-founded model is the smallest among them, according to the knowledge ordering. It is then a natural step to move from a three-valued semantics, allowing the representation of incomplete information, to a four-valued semantics, allowing the representation of inconsistency (denoted >). The resulting semantics is based on the well-known set of truth-values FOUR = ff; t; ?; >g, introduced by Belnap [7] to model a kind of 'relevance logic' (there should be some 'syntactical' connections between the antecedent and the consequent of a logical entailment relation j= , {see also [2, 17, 18, 31, 32] . This process of enlarging the set of truth-values culminated with Fitting's progressive work [20, 21, 22, 23, 24] on giving meaning to logic programs by relying on bilattices [27] . Bilattices, where FOUR is the simplest non-trivial one, play an important role in logic programming, and in knowledge representation in general. Indeed, Arieli and Avron show [4, 5] that the use of four values is preferable to the use of three values even for tasks that can in principle be handled using only three values. Moreover, Fitting explains clearly [23] why FOUR can be thought of as the 'home' of classical logic programming. Interestingly, the algebraic work of Fitting's xed-point characterisation of stable model semantics on bilattices [20, 21] has been the starting point of the work carried out by Denecker, Marek and Truszczy nski [14, 15, 16] , who extended Fitting's work to a more abstract context of xed-points operators on lattices, by relying on interval bilattices (these bilattices are obtained in a standard way as a product of a lattice {see, for instance [20, 24] ). Denecker, Marek and Truszczy nski [14, 16] showed interesting connections between (two-valued and four-valued) Kripke-Kleene [22] , well-founded and stable model semantics, as well as to Moore's autoepistemic logic [40] and Reiter's default logic [46] . Other well-established applications of bilattices and/or Kripke-Kleene, wellfounded and stable model semantics to give semantics to logic programs can be found in the context of reasoning under paraconsistency and uncertainty (see, e.g. [1, 3, 8, 10, 11, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41] ). Technically, classical twovalued stable models of logic programs are de ned in terms of xed-points of the so-called Gelfond-Lifschitz operator, GL(I), for a two-valued interpretation I. This operator has been generalized to bilattices by Fitting [20] , by means of the 0 P (I) operator, where this time I is an interpretation over bilattices. Informally, the main principle of these operators is based on the separation of the role of positive and negative information. That is, given a two-valued interpretation I, GL(I) is obtained by rst evaluating negative literals in a logic program P by means of I, determining the reduct P I of P, and then, as P I is now a positive program, to compute the minimal Herbrand model of P I by means of the usual Van Emden-Kowalski's immediate consequence operator T P [19, 33] . The computation of 0 P (I) for bilattices is similar. As a consequence, this separation avoids the natural management of classical negation (i.e. the evaluation of a negative literal :A is given by the negation of the evaluation of A), which is a major feature of the Kripke-Kleene semantics [22, 23] of logic programs with negation.
The primary goal of this study is to show, in the quite general setting of bilattices as space of truth-values, that this separation of positive and negative information is nor necessary nor is any program transformation required to characterize stable model semantics epistemologically. Another motivation is to evidence the role of CWA as a discriminating factor between the most commonly accepted semantics of logic programs. We show that the only di erence between Kripke-Kleene, well-founded and stable model semantics is the amount of knowledge taken from CWA that they integrate. We view CWA, informally as an additional source of information to be used for information completion, or more precisely, as a carrier of falsehood, to be considered cumulatively to Kripke-Kleene semantics. This allows us to view stable model semantics from a di erent, not yet investigated perspective. Roughly speaking, in Kripke-Kleene semantics, CWA is used to consider only those atoms that do not appear in head of any rule as false (and that can obviously not be inferred as true), while the well-founded and stable model semantics integrate more CWA-provided knowledge. To identify this knowledge, we introduce the notion of support. This is a generalization of the notion of greatest unfounded set [49] (which determines the atoms that can be assumed to be false) to the bilattice context. It determines in a principled way the amount of falsehood provided by CWA that can "safely" be assumed. More precisely, as we are considering a many-valued truth space, it provides the degree of falseness that can "safely" be assumed for each atom. We then show how the support can be used to complete the Kripke-Kleene semantics in order to obtain the well-founded and stable model semantics over bilattices. In particular, we show that the well-founded semantics is the least informative model in the set of models containing their own support, while a model is a stable model if and only if it is deductively closed under support completion, i.e. it contains exactly the knowledge that can be inferred by activating the rules over the support. We thus show an alternative characterisation of the stable model semantics to the well-known, widely applied and long studied technique based on the separation of positive and negative information in the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation, by reverting to the classical interpretation of negation. While the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation treats negation-as-failure in a special way and unlike other connectives, our approach is an attempt to relate the semantics of logic programs to a standard model-theoretic account of rules. We show that logic programs can be analyzed using standard logical means such as the notion of interpretation and information ordering, i.e. knowledge ordering. Therefore, in principle, our approach does not depend on the presence of any speci c connective, such as negation-as-failure, nor on any speci c rule syntax (the work of Herre and Wagner [28] , is in this direction, even if it di ers slightly from the usual stable model semantics [26] and the semantics is given in the context of the classical, two-valued truth-space). Due to the generality and the purely algebraic nature of our results, as just monotone operators over bilattices are postulated, the epistemic characterisation of stable models given in this study can also be applied in other contexts (e.g. uncertainty and/or paraconsistency in logic programming, and nonmonotonic logics such as default and autoepistemic logics).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In order to make the paper self-contained, in the next section, we will provide de nitions and properties of bilattices and logic programs. Section 3 is the main part of this work, where we present our characterisation of the stable model semantics, while Section 4 concludes.
Preliminaries

Lattices
A lattice is a partially ordered set hL; i such that every two element set fx; yg L has a least upper bound, lub (x; y) (called the join of x and y), and a greatest lower bound, glb (x; y) (called the meet of x and y). For ease, we will write x y if x y and x 6 = y. A lattice hL; i is complete if every subset of L has both least upper and greatest lower bounds. Consequently, a complete lattice has a least element, ?, and a greatest element >. For ease, throughout the paper, given a complete lattice hL; i and a subset of elements S L, with -least and -greatest we will always mean glb (S) and lub (S), respectively. With min (S) we denote the set of minimal elements in S w.r.t. , i.e. min (S) = fx 2 S: 6 9y 2 S s:t: y xg. Note that while glb (S) is unique, j min (S)j > 1 may hold. If min (S) is a singleton fxg, for convenience we may also write x = min (S) in place of fxg = min (S). An operator on a lattice
The basic tool for studying xed-points of operators on lattices is the wellknown Knaster-Tarski theorem [47] . Theorem 2.1 (Knaster-Tarski xed-point theorem [47] ) Let f be a monotone operator on a complete lattice hL; i. Then f has a xed-point, the set of xed-points of f is a complete lattice and, thus, f has a -least and a -greatest xed-point. The -least (respectively, -greatest) xed-point can be obtained by iterating f over ? (respectively, >), i.e. is the limit of the non-decreasing (respectively, non-increasing) sequence x 0 ; : : : ; x i ; x i+1 ; : : : ; x ; : : :, where for a successor ordinal i 0,
(respectively, x 0 = >), while for a limit ordinal ,
We denote the -least and the -greatest xed-point by lfp (f ) and gfp (f ), respectively. Throughout the paper, we will frequently de ne monotone operators, whose sets of xed-points de ne certain classes of models of a logic program. As a consequence, please note that this also means that a least model always exists for such classes. Additionally, for ease, for the monotone operators de ned in this study, we will specify the initial condition x 0 and the next iteration step x i+1 only, while Equation (1) is always considered as implicit. To prove that a property holds for a limit ordinal of an iterated sequence, i.e. for trans nite induction, one usually relies on a routine least upper bound (or greatest lower bound) argument and on the Knaster-Tarski theorem. Therefore that case will be considered only in the proof of Theorem 3.10, while the reasoning is similar for all the other proofs and, thus, will be omitted.
Bilattices
The simplest non-trivial bilattice, called FOUR, was de ned by Belnap [7] (see also [5, 6, 27] ), who introduced a logic intended to deal with incomplete and/or inconsistent information. FOUR already illustrates many of the basic properties of bilattices. Essentially, it extends the classical truth set ff; tg to its power set fffg; ftg; ;; ff; tgg, where we can think that each set indicates the amount of information we have in terms of truth: so, ffg stands for false, ftg for true and, quite naturally, ; for lack of information or unknown, and ff; tg for inconsistent information (for ease, we use f for ffg, t for ftg, ? for ; and > for ff; tg). The set of truth values ff; t; ?; >g has two quite intuitive and natural 'orthogonal' orderings, k and t (see Figure 1) , each giving to FOUR the structure of a complete lattice. One is the so-called knowledge ordering, denoted k , and is based on the subset relation, that is, if x y then y represents 'more information' than x (e.g. ? = ; ftg = t, i.e. ? k t). The other ordering is the so-called truth ordering, denoted t . Here x t y means that x is 'at least as false as y, and y is at least as true as x', i.e. x\ftg y \ftg and y \ ffg x \ ffg (e.g. ? t t). The general notion of bilattice used in this paper is de ned as follows [21, 27] . A bilattice is a structure hB; t ; k i where B is a non-empty set and t and k are both partial orderings giving B the structure of a complete lattice with a top and bottom element. Meet and join under t , denoted^and _, correspond to extensions of classical conjunction and disjunction. On the other hand, meet and join under k are denoted and . x y corresponds to the maximal information x and y can agree on, while x y simply combines the information represented by x with that represented by y. Top and bottom under t are denoted t and f, and top and bottom under k are denoted > and ?, respectively. We will assume that bilattices are in nitary distributive bilattices in which all distributive laws connecting^; _; and hold. We also assume that every bilattice satis es the in nitary interlacing conditions, i.e. each of the lattice operations^; _; and is monotone w.r.t. both orderings. An example of interlacing condition is: x t y and x 0 t y 0 implies x x 0 t y y 0 . Finally, we assume that each bilattice has a negation, i.e. an operator : that reverses the t ordering, leaves unchanged the k ordering, and veri es ::x = x 1 . Below, we give some properties of bilattices that will be used in this study. Figure 2 illustrates intuitively some of the following lemmas.
Lemma 2.2 ([20])
1. If x t y t z then x z k y and y k x z; 2. If x k y k z then x^z t y and y t x _ z. Lemma 2.3 If x t y then x t x y t y and x t x y t y.
Proof. Straightforward using the interlacing conditions. Lemma 2.4
1. If x t y then f x t y; 1 The dual operation to negation is con ation, i.e. an operator that reverses the k ordering, leaves unchanged the t ordering, and x = x. If a bilattice has both, they commute if :x = : x for all x. We will not deal with con ation in this paper. Proof. If x t y then from f t x and by Lemma 2.3, f t f x t x t y. If x k y then, from f t x, we have f y t x y = x. Lemma 2.5 If x z t y then z k y f.
Therefore, x t (f y) ((f y) _ y) and, thus, x t (f y) y = y. Lemma 2.7 If x k y and x t y then x f = y f.
Proof. By Lemma 2.4, f y t x and, thus, f y t x f follows. From x t y, f x t y f holds. Therefore, x f = y f.
Bilattice construction
Bilattices come up in natural ways. There are two general, but di erent, construction methods, to build a bilattice from a lattice which are widely used. We only outline them here in order to give an idea of their application (see also [20, 27] ).
The rst bilattice construction method was proposed by [27] . Suppose we have two complete distributive lattices hL 1 ; 1 i and hL 2 ; 2 i. Think of L 1 as a lattice of values we use when we measure the degree of belief, while think of L 2 as the lattice we use when we measure the degree of doubt. Now, we de ne the structure L 1 L 2 as follows. The structure is hL 1 L 2 ; t ; k i, where hx 1 ; x 2 i t hy 1 ; y 2 i if x 1 1 y 1 and y 2 2 x 2 ;
In L 1 L 2 the idea is: knowledge goes up if both degree of belief and degree of doubt go up; truth goes up if the degree of belief goes up, while the degree of doubt goes down. It can easily be veri ed that
we are measuring belief and doubt in the same way (e.g. L = ff; tg), then negation can be de ned as :hx; yi = hy; xi, i.e. negation switches the roles of belief and doubt. Applications of this method can be found, for instance, in [1, 27, 28] .
The second construction method has been sketched in [27] and addressed in more detail in [24] , and is probably the more used one. Suppose we have a complete distributive lattice of truth values hL; i. Think of these values as the 'real' values in which we are interested, but due to lack of knowledge we are able just to 'approximate' the exact values. Rather than considering a pair hx; yi 2 L L as indicator for degree of belief and doubt, hx; yi is interpreted as the set of elements z 2 L such that x z y. That is, a pair hx; yi is interpreted as an interval. An interval hx; yi may be seen as an approximation of an exact value. For instance, in reasoning under uncertainty (see, e.g. [35, 36, 37] ), L is the unit interval [0; 1] with standard ordering, L L is interpreted as the set of (closed) intervals in [0; 1], and the pair hx; yi is interpreted as a lower and an upper bound of the exact value of the certainty value. A similar interpretation is given in [14, 15, 16] , but this time L is the set of two-valued interpretations, and a pair hJ I ; J + I i 2 L L is interpreted as a lower and upper bound approximation of the application of a monotone (immediate consequence) operator O: L ! L to an interpretation I.
Formally, given the lattice hL; i, the bilattice of intervals is hL L; t ; k i, where: hx 1 ; x 2 i t hy 1 ; y 2 i if x 1 y 1 and x 2 y 2 ; hx 1 ; x 2 i k hy 1 ; y 2 i if x 1 y 1 and y 2 x 2 .
The intuition of these orders is that truth increases if the interval contains greater values, whereas the knowledge increases when the interval becomes more precise. Negation can be de ned as :hx; yi = h:y; :xi, where : is a negation operator on L. Note that, if L = ff; tg, and if we assign f = hf; fi, t = ht; ti, ? = hf; ti and > = ht; fi, then we obtain a structure that is isomorphic to the bilattice FOUR.
Logic programs, interpretations, models and program knowledge completions
We recall here the de nitions given in [20] . This setting is as general as possible, so that the results proved in this paper will be widely applicable.
Classical logic programming has the set ff; tg as its truth space, but as stated by Fitting [20] , \FOUR can be thought as the 'home' of ordinary logic programming and its natural extension is to bilattices other than FOUR: the more general the setting the more general the results". We will also consider bilattices as the truth space of logic programs.
Logic programs
Consider an alphabet of predicate symbols, of constants, of function symbols and variable symbols. A term, t, is either a variable x, a constant c or of the form f (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ), where f is an n-ary function symbol and all t i are terms. An atom, A, is of the form p(t 1 ; : : : ; t n ), where p is an n-ary predicate symbol and all t i are terms. A literal, l, is of the form A or :A, where A is an atom. A formula, ', is an expression built up from the literals and the members of a bilattice B using^; _; ; ; 9 and 8. Note that members of the bilattice may appear in a formula, e.g. in FOUR, (p^q) (r f) is a formula. A rule is of the form p(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) '(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ), where p is an n-ary predicate symbol and all x i are variables. The atom p(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) is called the head, and the formula '(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) is called the body. It is assumed that the free variables of the body are among x 1 ; : : : ; x n . Free variables are thought of as universally quanti ed. A logic program, denoted with P, is a nite set of rules. The Herbrand universe of P is the set of ground (variable-free) terms that can be built from the constants and function symbols occurring in P, while the Herbrand base of P (denoted B P ) is the set of ground atoms over the Herbrand universe.
De nition 2.8 (P ) Given a logic program P, the associated set P is constructed as follows;
1. put in P all ground instances of members of P (over the Herbrand base); 2. if a ground atom A is not head of any rule in P , then add the rule A f to P . Note that it is a standard practice in logic programming to consider such atoms as false. We incorporate this by explicitly adding A f to P ; 3. replace several ground rules in P having same head, A ' 1 , A ' 2 , . . . with A ' 1 _ ' 2 _ : : :. As there could be in nitely many grounded rules with same head, we may end with a countable disjunction, but the semantics behavior is unproblematic.
Note that in P , each ground atom appears in the head of exactly one rule.
Interpretations
Let hB; t ; k i be a bilattice. By interpretation of a logic program on the bilattice we mean a mapping I from ground atoms to members of B. An interpretation I is extended from atoms to formulae as follows:
2. for formulae ' and '
, and similarly for _; ; and :; and
: t ground termg, and similarly for universal quanti cation 2 .
The family of all interpretations is denoted by I(B). The truth and knowledge orderings are extended from B to I(B) as follows:
, for every ground atom A; and
Given two interpretations I; J, we de ne (I^J)(') = I(')^J('), and similarly for the other operations. With I f and I t we denote the bottom and top interpretations under t (they map any atom into f and t, respectively). With I ? and I > we denote the bottom and top interpretations under k (they map any atom into ? and >, respectively). It is easy to see that the space of interpretations hI(B); t ; k i is an in nitary interlaced and distributive bilattice as well.
Classical setting
Note that in a classical logic program the body is a conjunction of literals. Therefore, if A ' 2 P , then ' = ' 1 _ : : : _ ' n and ' i = L i1^: : :^L in . Furthermore, a classical total interpretation is an interpretation over FOUR such that an atom is mapped into either f or t. A partial classical interpretation is a classical interpretation where the truth of some atom may be left unspeci ed. This is the same as saying that the interpretation maps all atoms into either f; t or ?. For a set of literals X, with ::X we indicate the set f:L: L 2 Xg, where for any atom A, ::A is replaced with A. Then, a classical interpretation (total or partial) can also be represented as a consistent set of literals, i.e. I B P [::B P and for all atoms A, fA; :Ag 6 I. Of course, the opposite is also true, i.e. a consistent set of literals can straightforwardly be turned into an interpretation over FOUR.
Models
An interpretation I is a model of a logic program P, denoted by I j= P, if and only if for each rule A ' in P , I(') t I(A). With mod(P) we identify the set of models of P.
From all models of a logic program P, Fitting [20, 21] identi es a subset, which obeys the so-called Clark-completion procedure [9] . Essentially, we replace in P each occurrence of with $: an interpretation I is a Clarkcompletion model, cl-model for short, of a logic program P, denoted by I j= cl P, if and only if for each rule A ' in P , I(A) = I('). With mod cl (P) we identify the set of cl-models of P. Of course mod cl (P) mod(P) holds.
Example 2.9 Consider the following logic program
where is a value of a bilattice such that t : and A is a ground atom. Then P is
Consider Figure 3 . The set of models of P, mod(P ), is the set of interpretations assigning to A a value in the area (M -area in Figure 3 ) delimited by the extremal points, : ; : ; t; t and t. The k -least element I of mod(P ) is such that I(A) = t. The set of cl-models of P, mod cl (P ), is the set of interpretations assigning to A a value on the vertical line, in between the extremal points : and : and are all truth minimal. The k -least element I 0 of mod cl (P ) is such that I 0 (A) = : . Note that I is not a cl-model of P and, thus, mod cl (P ) mod(P ).
Clark-completion models also have an alternative characterisation.
De nition 2.10 (general reduct) Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respectively. The general reduct of P w.r.t. I, denoted P[I] is the program obtained from P in which each (ground) rule A ' 2 P is replaced with A I(').
Note that any model J of P[I] is such that for all rules A ' 2 P , I(') t J(A). But, in P each ground atom appears in the head of exactly one rule. Therefore, it is easily veri ed that any t -minimal model J of P[I] is such that J(A) = I(') and there can be just one such model, i.e. J = min t fJ 0 :
We have the following theorem, which allows us to express the cl-models of a logic program in terms of its models.
Theorem 2.11 Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respectively. Then I j= cl P i I = min t fJ: J j= P[I]g. Proof. I j= cl P i for all A ' 2 P , I(A) = I(') holds i (as noted above) I = min t fJ: J j= P[I]g. The above theorem establishes that Clark-completion models are xed-points of the operator P : I(B) ! I(B), de ned as
i.e. I j= cl P i I = P (I).
Program knowledge completions
Finally, given an interpretation I, we introduce the notion of program knowledge completion, or simply, k-completion with I, denoted P I. The program kcompletion of P with I, is the program obtained by replacing any rule of the form A ' 2 P by A ' I(A). The idea is to enforce any model J of P I to contain at least the knowledge determined by P and I. Note that J j= P I does not imply J j= P. For instance, given P = fA A :Ag and I = J = I f , then P I = fA (A :A) fg and J j= P I, while J 6 j= P.
Additional remarks
Please note that the use of the negation, :, in literals has to be understood as classical negation. The expression not L (where L is a literal) appearing quite often as syntactical construct in logic programs, indicating 'L is not provable', is not part of our language. This choice is intentional, as we want to stress that in this study CWA will be considered as an additional source of (or carrier of) falsehood in an abstract sense and will be considered as a 'cumulative' information source with the classical semantics (Kripke-Kleene semantics). In this sense, our approach is an attempt to relate the stable model semantics of logic programs to a standard model-theoretic account of rules, relying on standard logical means as the notion of interpretation and knowledge ordering.
Semantics of logic programs
In logic programming, usually the semantics of a program P is determined by selecting a particular interpretation, or a set of interpretations, of P in the set of models of P. We consider three semantics, which are probably the most popular and widely studied semantics for logic programs with negation, namely Kripke-Kleene semantics, well-founded semantics and stable model semantics, in increasing order of knowledge.
Kripke-Kleene semantics
Kripke-Kleene semantics [22] has a simple, intuitive and epistemic characterization, as it corresponds to the least cl-model of a logic program under the knowledge order k . Kripke-Kleene semantics is essentially a generalization of the least model characterization of classical programs without negation over the truth space ff; tg (see [19, 33] ) to logic programs with classical negation evaluated over bilattices under Clark's program completion. More formally,
De nition 2.12 (Kripke-Kleene semantics)
The Kripke-Kleene model of a logic program P is the k -least cl-model of P, i.e.
For instance, by referring to Example 2.9, the value of A w.r.t. the Kripke-Kleene semantics of P is KK(P)(A) = : . Note that by Theorem 2.11 and by Equation (2) we have also
Kripke-Kleene semantics also has an alternative, and better known, xed-point characterization, which relies on the well-known P immediate consequence operator. P is a generalization of the Van Emden-Kowalski's immediate consequence operator T P [19, 33] to bilattices under Clark's program completion.
Interesting properties of P are that (i) P relies on the classical evaluation of negation, i.e. the evaluation of a negative literal :A is given by the negation of the evaluation of A; and (ii) P is monotone with respect to the knowledge ordering and, thus, has a k -least xed-point, which coincides with the Kripke-Kleene semantics of P. Formally, De nition 2.13 (immediate consequence operator P ) Consider a logic program P. The immediate consequence operator P : I(B) ! I(B) is de ned as follows. For I 2 I(B), P (I) is the interpretation, which for any ground atom A such that A ' occurs in P , satis es P (I)(A) = I(').
It can easily be shown that Theorem 2.14 ( [20] ) In the space of interpretations, the operator P is monotone under k , the set of xed-points of P is a complete lattice under k and, thus, P has a k -least xed-point. Furthermore, I is a cl-model of a program P i I is a xed-point of P . Therefore, the Kripke-Kleene model of P coincides with P 's least xed-point under k .
For instance, by referring to Example 2.9, the set of xed-points of P coincides with the set of interpretations assigning to A a value on the vertical line, in between the extremal points : and : . The above theorem relates the model theoretic and epistemic characterization of the Kripke-Kleene semantics to a least xed-point characterization. By relying on P we also know how to e ectively compute KK(P) as given by the Knaster-Tarski Theorem 2.1.
Please, note that from Theorem 2.11 and Equation (2), it follows immediately that Corollary 2.15 Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respectively. Then P (I) = P (I).
Proof. Let I 0 = P (I) = min t (fJ: J j= P[I]g). Then we have that for any ground atom A, P (I)(A) = I 0 (A) = I(') = P (I)(A), i.e. P (I) = P (I). As a consequence, all de nitions and properties given in this paper in terms of P and/or cl-models may be given in terms of P and/or models as well. As P is a well-known operator, for ease of presentation we will continue use it.
We conclude this section with the following simple lemma, which will be used later in the paper.
Lemma 2.16 Let P be a logic program and let J and I be interpretations. Then
Stable model and well-founded semantics
A commonly accepted approach towards provide a stronger semantics or a semantics that is more informative to logic programs than the Kripke-Kleene semantics, consists in relying on CWA to complete the available knowledge. Of the various approaches to the management of negation in logic programming, the stable model semantics approach, introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz [25] with respect to the classical two valued truth space ff; tg has become one of the most widely studied and most commonly accepted proposal. Informally, a set of ground atoms I is a stable model of a classical logic program P if I = I 0 , where I 0 is computed according to the so-called Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation:
1. substitute ( x) in P the negative literals by their evaluation with respect to I. Let P I be the resulting positive program, called reduct of P w.r.t. I;
2. let I 0 be the minimal Herbrand (truth-minimal) model of P I .
This approach de nes a whole family of models and it has been shown in [44] that the minimal one according to the knowledge ordering corresponds to the well-founded semantics [49] . The extension of the notions of stable model and well-founded semantics to the context of bilattices is due to Fitting [20] . He proposes a generalization of the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation to bilattices by means of the binary immediate consequence operator P . Similarly to that of the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation, the basic principle of P is to separate the roles of positive and negative information. Informally, P accepts two input interpretations over a bilattice, the rst is used to assign meanings to positive literals, while the second is used to assign meanings to negative literals. P is monotone in both arguments in the knowledge ordering k . But, with respect to the truth ordering t , P is monotone in the rst argument, while it is antitone in the second argument (indeed, as the truth of a positive literal increases, the truth of its negation decreases). Computationally, Fitting follows the idea of the GelfondLifschitz transformation shown above: the idea is to x an interpretation for negative information and to compute the t -least model of the resulting positive program. To this end, Fitting [20] additionally introduced the 0 P operator, which for a given interpretation I of negative literals, computes the t -least model, 0 P (I) = lfp t ( x: P (x; I)). The xed-points of 0 P are the stable models, while the least xed-point of 0 P under k is the well-founded semantics of P.
Formally, let I and J be two interpretations in the bilattice hI(B); t ; k i. The notion of pseudo-interpretation I 4 J over the bilattice is de ned as follows (I gives meaning to positive literals, while J gives meaning to negative literals): for a pure ground atom A:
Pseudo-interpretations are extended to non-literals in the obvious way. We can now de ne P as follows.
De nition 2.17 (immediate consequence operator P ) The immediate consequence operator P : I(B) I(B) ! I(B) is de ned as follows. For I; J 2 I(B), P (I; J) is the interpretation, which for any ground atom A such that A ' occurs in P , satis es P (I; J)(A) = (I 4 J)(').
Note that P is a special case of P , as from construction P (I) = P (I; I). The following theorem can be shown.
Theorem 2.18 ([20])
In the space of interpretations the operator P is monotone in both arguments under k , and under the ordering t it is monotone in its rst argument and antitone in its second argument.
We are ready now to de ne the 0 P operator.
De nition 2.19 (stability operator 0 P ) The stability operator of P is the single input operator 0 P given by: 0 P (I) is the t -least xed-point of the operator x: P (x; I), i.e. Note that it can be seen immediately from the de nition of
and, thus,
By Theorem 2.20 and the Knaster-Tarski Theorem 2.1, the set of xed-points of 0 P , i.e. the set of stable models of P, is a complete lattice under k and, thus, 0 P has a k -least xed-point, which is denoted W F (P). W F (P) is known 3 As P I is positive, it has a unique truth-minimal model.
as the well-founded model of P and, by de nition, coincides with the k -least stable model, i.e.
The characterization of the well-founded model in terms of least xed-point of 0 P also gives us a way to e ectively compute it. It is interesting to note, that for classical logic programs the original de nition of well-founded semantics is based on the well-known notion of unfounded set [49] . The underlying principle of the notion of unfounded sets is to identify the set of atoms that can safely be assumed false if the current information about a logic program is given by an interpretation I. Indeed, given a classical interpretation I and a classical logic program P, a set of ground atoms X B P is an unfounded set (i.e., the atoms in X can be assumed as false) for P w.r.t. I i for each atom A 2 X,
A well-known property of unfounded sets is that the union of two unfounded sets of P w.r.t. I is an unfounded set as well and, thus, there is a unique greatest unfounded set for P w.r.t. I, denoted by U P (I). Now, consider the usual immediate consequence operator T P , where for any ground atom A,
and consider the well-founded operator [49] over classical interpretations I W P (I) = T P (I) [ ::U P (I) :
W P (I) can be rewritten as W P (I) = T P (I) ::U P (I), by assuming = [; = \ in the lattice h2 BP [::BP ; i (the partial order corresponds to the knowledge order k ). Then, the well-founded semantics is de ned to be the k -least xed-point of W P in [49] , and it is shown in [ 30] that the set of total stable models of P coincides with the set of total xed-points of W P .
In particular, this formulation reveals that the greatest unfounded set, ::U P (I), is the additional \false default knowledge", which is introduced by CWA into the usual semantics of logic programs given by T P . However, W P does not allow partial stable models to be identi ed. Indeed, there are xed-points of W P (I) that are partial interpretations, which are not stable models.
We conclude the preliminary part of the paper with the following result that adds to Fitting's analysis that stable models are incomparable with each other with respect to the truth order t . Theorem 2.22 Let I and J be two stable models such that I 6 = J. Then I 6 t J and J 6 t I.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that either I t J or J t I holds. Without loss of generality, assume I t J. By Theorem 2.20, 0 P is antitone in the t ordering. Therefore, from I t J it follows that J = 0 P (J) t 0 P (I) = I holds and, thus, I = J, a contradiction to the hypothesis.
Stable model semantics revisited
In the following, by relying on CWA as a source of falsehood for knowledge completion, we provide epistemic and xed-point based, characterizations of the well-founded and stable model semantics over bilattices that are alternative to the one provided by Fitting [20] . We proceed in three steps.
(i) In the next section, we introduce the notion of support, denoted s P (I), with respect to a logic program P and an interpretation I. The support is a generalization of the notion of greatest unfounded set (which determines the atoms that can be assumed to be false) w.r.t. I from classical logic programming to bilattices. Intuitively, we regard CWA as an additional source of information for falsehood to be used to complete I. The support s P (I) of P w.r.t. I determines in a principled way the amount, or degree, of falsehood provided by CWA to the atom's truth that can be added to current knowledge I about the program P. It turns out that for classical logic programs the support coincides with the negation of the greatest unfounded set, i.e. s P (I) = ::U P (I).
(ii) Any model I of P containing its support, i.e. such that s P (I) k I, tells us that the additional source of falsehood provided by CWA cannot contribute improving our knowledge about the program P. We call such models supported models of P; this will be discussed in Section 3.2. Supported models can be characterized as xed-points of the operator
which is very similar to the W P operator in Equation (7), but generalized to bilattices. As expected, it can be shown that the k -least supported model is the well-founded model of P. Unfortunately, while for classical logic programs and total interpretations, supported models characterize total stable models (in fact, they coincides with the xed-points of W P ), this is not true in the general case of interpretations over bilattices.
Therefore, we further re ne the class of supported models, by introducing the class of models deductively closed under support k-completion. This class requires supported models to satisfy some minimality condition with respect to the knowledge order k . Indeed, such a model I has to be deductively closed according to the Kripke-Kleene semantics of the program k-completed with its support, i.e. I = KK(P s P (I)) (8) or, equivalently
(iii) We will show that any such interpretation I is a stable model of P and vice-versa, i.e. I 2 stable(P) i I = min k (mod cl (P s P (I)), which is quite suggestive. Note that until now, stable models (over bilattices) have been characterized as by Equation (5). Equation (9) above shows thus that stable models can be characterized as those models that contain their support and are deductively closed under the Kripke-Kleene semantics. As such, we can identify the support (unfounded set, in classical terms) as the added-value (in terms of knowledge), which is brought into by the stable model semantics with respect to the standard Kripke-Kleene semantics of P.
Finally, stable models can thus be de ned in terms of xed-points of the operator KK(P s P ( )), which relies on a, though intuitive, program transformation P s P ( ). We further introduce a new operator 0 P , which we show to have the property that 0 P (I) = KK(P s P (I)). This operator clearly shows that a model is a stable model i it contains exactly the knowledge obtained by activating the rules over its support, without any other extra knowledge. An important property of 0 P is that it does depend on P only. This may be important in the classical logic programming case where P s P ( ) is not easy to de ne (as does not belong to the language of classical logic programs). As a consequence, no program transformation is required, which completes our analysis.
We will rely on the following running example to illustrate the concepts that will be introduced in the next sections. In Table 1 we report the cl-models I i , the Kripke-Kleene, the well-founded and the stable models of P, marked by bullets. Note that according to Theorem 2.22, stable models cannot be compared with each other under t , while under the knowledge order, I 3 is the least informative model (i.e. the well-founded model), while I 6 is the most informative one (I 4 and I 5 are incomparable under k ).
Support
The main notion we introduce here is that of support of a logic program P with respect to a given interpretation I. If I represents what we already know about an intended model of P, the support represents the k -greatest amount/degree of falsehood provided by CWA that can be joined to I in order to complete I. Falsehood is always represented in terms of an interpretation, which we call a safe interpretation. The main principle underlying safe interpretations f ? ?
can be explained as follows. For ease, let us consider FOUR. Consider an interpretation I, which is our current knowledge about P. Let us assume that the interpretation J, with J k I f , indicates which atoms may be assumed as f. For any ground atom A, J(A) is the default 'false' information provided by J to the atom A. The completion of I with J is the interpretation I J. In order to accept this completion, we have to ensure that the assumed false knowledge about A, J(A), is entailed by P w.r.t. the completed interpretation I J, i.e. for A ' 2 P , J(A) k (I J)(') should hold. That is, after completing the current knowledge I about P with the 'falsehood' assumption J, the inferred information about A, (I J)('), should increase. Formally, De nition 3.2 (safe interpretation) Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respectively. An interpretation J is safe w.r.t. P and I i :
As anticipated, safe interpretations have an interesting reading once we restrict our attention to the classical framework of logic programming: indeed, the concept of safe interpretation reduces to that of unfounded set. Theorem 3.3 Let P and I be a classical logic program and a classical interpretation, respectively. Let X be a subset of B P . Then X is an unfounded set of P w.r.t. I i ::X k P (I ::X) 4 , i.e. ::X is safe w.r.t. P and I.
Proof. Assume :A 2 ::X ( i.e. ::X(:A) = t) and, thus, A 2 X (i.e. X(A) = f). Therefore, by de nition of unfounded sets, if A ' 2 P , where ' = ' 1 _ : : : _ ' n and ' i = L i1^: : :^L in , then either I(' i ) = f or ::X(' i ) = f. Therefore, (I [ ::X)(') = f, i.e. (I ::X)(') = f. But then, by de nition of P , we have that P (I ::X)(A) = f, i.e. P (I ::X)(:A) = t. Therefore, ::X k P (I ::X). The other direction can be shown similarly. The following example illustrates the concept.
Example 3.4 (running example cont.) Let us consider I 2 . I 2 dictates that p is unknown, q is true and that r is false. Consider the interpretations J i de ned as follows:
It is easy to verify that J i k I f and J i k P (I 2 J i ). Therefore, all the J i s are safe. The k -least safe interpretation is J 1 , while the k -greatest safe interpretation is J 4 = J 1 J 2 J 3 . J 4 dictates that under I 2 , we can 'safely' assume that both p and r are false. Note that if we join J 4 to I 2 we obtain the stable model I 5 , where I 2 k I 5 . Thus, J 4 improves the knowledge expressed by I 2 .
It might be asked why we do not consider q false as well. In fact, if we consider p; q and r false, after joining to I and applying P , q becomes true, which is knowledge-incompatible with q's previous knowledge status (q is false). So, q's falsehood is not preserved.
We also consider another example on a more general bilattice allowing the management of uncertainty. The fourth rule asserts that the truth value of D is exactly 0.7. Then using the third rule, we will infer that the value of C is given by the disjunction of 0.7 and the value of C itself which is initially unknown, i.e. between 0 and 1, thus our knowledge about C is that its value is at least 0. Relying on CWA, we should be able to provide a more precise characterization of A, B and C. It can be veri ed that it may be safely assumed that A is false ([0; 0]) and that the truth of B and C is at most 0.3 and 0.7, respectively, which combined with I determines a more precise interpretation where A is false, B is at most 0:3, C is 0:7 and D is 0:7, respectively, as highlighted in the following Both J 1 and J 2 are safe w.r.t. P and I. It is easy to see that J 0 = J 1 J 2 is the k -greatest safe interpretation. Interestingly, note how J 0 provides to I some additional information on the values of A, B and C, respectively.
Of all possible safe interpretations w.r.t. P and I, we are interested in the maximal one under k , which is unique. The k -greatest safe interpretation will be called the support provided by CWA to P w.r.t. I.
De nition 3.6 (support) Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respectively. The support provided by CWA to P w.r.t. I, or simply support of P w.r.t. I, denoted s P (I), is the k -greatest safe interpretation w.r.t. P and I, and is given by s P (I) = M fJ: J is safe w.r.t. P and Ig :
It is easy to show that support is a well-de ned concept. Consider X = fJ: J is safe w.r.t. P and Ig. As the bilattice is a complete lattice under k , lub k (X) = J2X J and, thus, by de nition s P (I) = lub k (X). Now consider J 2 X. Therefore J k s P (I). But J is safe, so J k I f and J k P (I J) k P (I s P (I)) (by k -monotonicity of P ). As a consequence, both I f and P (I s P (I)) are upper bounds of X. But s P (I) is the least upper bound of X and, thus, s P (I) k I f and s P (I) k P (I s P (I)) follows. That is, s P (I) is safe and the k -greatest safe interpretation w.r.t. P and I.
It follows immediately from Theorem 3.3 that, in the classical setting, the notion of greatest unfounded set is captured by the notion of support, i.e. the > > > f f f fp; q; rg support tells us which atoms may be safely assumed to be false, given a classical interpretation I and a classical logic program P. Therefore, the notion of support extends the notion of greatest unfounded sets from the classical setting to bilattices.
Corollary 3.7 Let P and I be a classical logic program and a classical interpretation, respectively. Then s P (I) = ::U P (I).
Example 3.8 (running example cont.) Table 2 extends Table 1 also by including the supports s P (I i ). Note that, according to Corollary 3.7, s P (I i ) = ::U P (I i ).
Having de ned the support model-theoretically, we next show how the support can e ectively be computed as the iterated xed-point of a function,
I
P , that depends on P only. Intuitively, the iterated computation weakens I f , i.e. CWA, until we arrive to the k -greatest safe interpretation, i.e. the support.
De nition 3.9 (support function) Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respectively. The support function, denoted I P , w.r.t. P and I is the function mapping interpretations into interpretations de ned as follows: for any interpretation J,
It is easy to verify that I P is monotone w.r.t. k . The following theorem determines how to compute the support. 
Let us show that F
I is safe and k -greatest.
, so F I is safe w.r.t. P and I. Consider any X safe w.r.t. P and I. We show by induction on i that X k F I i and, thus, at the limit
. By induction, using the monotonicity of Note that by construction
which establishes also that the support is deductively closed in terms of falsehood. In fact, even if we add all that we know about the atom's falsehood to the current interpretation I, we know no more about the atom's falsehood than we knew before. Interestingly, for a classical logic program P and a classical interpretation I, by Corollary 3.7, the above method gives us a simple top-down method to compute the negation of the greatest unfounded set, ::U P (I), as the limit of the sequence:
The support s P (I) can be seen as an operator over the space of interpretations. The following theorem asserts that the support is monotone w.r.t. k . 
, which concludes. The next corollary follows directly from Lemma 2.4.
Corollary 3.12 Let P be a logic program and consider two interpretations I and J such that I k J. Then s P (J) t s P (I).
Models based on the support
Of all possible models of a program P, we are especially interested in those models I that already integrate their own support, i.e. that could not be completed by CWA.
De nition 3.13 (supported model) Consider a logic program P. An interpretation I is a supported model of P i I j= cl P and s P (I) k I.
If we consider the de nition of support in the classical setting, then supported models are classical models of classical logic programs such that ::U P (I) I, i.e. the false atoms provided by the greatest unfounded set are already false in the interpretation I. Therefore, CWA does not further contribute improving I's knowledge about the program P.
Example 3.14 (running example cont.) Table 3 extends Table 2 by also including supported models. Note that while both I 8 and I 9 are models of P including their support, they are not stable models. Note also that s P (I 8 ) = s P (I 5 ) and s P (I 9 ) = s P (I 6 ). That is, I 8 and I 9 , which are not stable models, have the same support of some stable model.
Supported models have interesting properties, as stated below.
Theorem 3.15 Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respectively. The following statements are equivalent:
1. I is a supported model of P;
2. I = P (I) s P (I); 3. I j= cl P s P (I);
4. I = P (I s P (I)). Table 3 : Running example cont.: supported models of P.
Proof. Assume Point 1. holds, i.e. I j= cl P and s P (I) k I. Then, I = P (I) = P (I) s P (I), so Point 2. holds.
Assume Point 2. holds. Then, by Lemma 2.16, I = P (I) s P (I) = P sP (I) (I), i.e. I j= cl P s P (I), so Point 3. holds. Assume Point 3. holds. So, s P (I) k I and from the safeness of s P (I), it follows that s P (I) k P (I s P (I)) = P (I) and, thus, I = P sP (I) (I) = P (I) s P (I) = P (I). Therefore, P (I s P (I)) = P (I) = I, so Point 4. holds.
Finally, assume Point 4. holds. From the safeness of s P (I), it follows that s P (I) k P (I s P (I)) = I. Therefore, I = P (I s P (I)) = P (I) and, thus I is a supported model of P. So, Point 1. holds, which concludes the proof. The above theorem states the same concept in di erent ways: supported models contain the amount of knowledge expressed by the program and their support.
From a xed-point characterization point of view, from Theorem 3.15 it follows that the set of supported models can be identi ed by the xed-points of the k -monotone operators P and~ P de ned by
It follows immediately that Theorem 3.16 Let P be a logic program. Then~ P ( P ) is monotone under k . Furthermore, an interpretation I is a supported model i I =~ P (I) (I = P (I)) and, thus, relying on the Knaster-Tarski xed-point theorem (Theorem 2.1), the set of supported models is a complete lattice under k .
Note that P has been de ned rst in [ 38] without recognizing that it characterizes supported models. However, it has been shown in [38] that the least xed-point under k coincides with the well-founded semantics, i.e. in our context, the k -least supported model of P is the well-founded semantics of P.
) and stable models are xed-points of P (~ P ).
Example 3.18 (running example cont.) Consider Table 3 . Note that stable models are supported models, i.e. xed-points of~ P ( P ), and that the kleast supported model coincides with the well-founded model. Additionally, I 8 and I 9 are xed-points of~ P ( P ) and not stable models. Thus, stable models are a proper subset of supported models.
Note that the above theorem is not surprising considering that the~ P operator is quite similar to the W P operator de ned in Equation (7) for classical logic programs and interpretations. The above theorem essentially extends the relationship to general logic programs interpreted over bilattices. But, while for classical logical programs and total interpretations,~ P (I) characterizes stable total models (as,~ P = W P ), this is not true in the general case of interpretations over bilattices (e.g., see Table 3 ).
As highlighted in Examples 3.14 and 3.18, supported models are not speci c enough to completely identify stable models: we must further re ne the notion of supported models. Example 3.14 gives us a hint. For instance, consider the supported model I 8 . As already noted, the support (in classical terms, the greatest unfounded set) of I 8 coincides with that of I 5 , but for this support, i.e. s P (I 5 ), I 5 is the k -least informative cl-model, i.e. I 5 k I 8 . Similarly, for support s P (I 6 ), I 6 is the k -least informative cl-model, i.e. I 6 k I 9 . It appears clearly that some supported models contain knowledge that cannot be inferred from the program or from CWA. This may suggest partitioning supported models into sets of cl-models with a given support and then taking the least informative one to avoid that the supported models contain unexpected extra knowledge.
Formally, for a given interpretation I, we will consider the class of all models of P s P (I), i.e. interpretations which contain the knowledge entailed by P and the support s P (I), and then take the k -least model. If this k -least model is I itself then I is a supported model of P deductively closed under support k-completion.
De nition 3.19 (model deductively closed under support k-completion)
Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respectively. Then I is a model deductively closed under support k-completion of P i I = min k (mod cl (P s P (I))).
Note that by Lemma 2.16,
Therefore, if I is a model deductively closed under support k-completion then I = P (I) s P (I), i.e. I j= cl P s P (I). Therefore, by Theorem 3.15, any model deductively closed under support k-completion is also a supported model, i.e. I j= cl P and s P (I) k I. Interestingly, models deductively closed under support k-completion have also a di erent, equivalent and quite suggestive characterization. In fact, from the de nition it follows immediately that min k (mod cl (P s P (I))) = KK(P s P (I)) :
It then follows that Theorem 3.20 Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respectively. Then I is a model deductively closed under support k-completion of P i I = KK(P s P (I)).
That is, given an interpretation I and logic program P, among all cl-models of P, we are looking for the k -least cl-models deductively closed under support kcompletion, i.e. models containing only the knowledge that can be inferred from P and from the safe part of CWA identi ed by its k-maximal safe interpretation.
Example 3.21 (running example cont.) Table 4 extends Table 3 , by including models deductively closed under support k-completion. Note that now both I 8 and I 9 have been ruled out, as they are not minimal with respect to a given support, i.e. I 8 6 = min k (mod cl (P s P (I 8 ))) = min k (mod cl (P s P (I 5 ))) = KK(P s P (I 5 )) = I 5 and I 9 6 = KK(P s P (I 9 )) = KK(P s P (I 6 )) = I 6 .
Finally, we can note that an immediate consequence operator characterizing models deductively closed under support k-completion can be derived immediately from Theorem 3.20, i.e. by relying on the operator KK(P s P ( )). In the following we present the operator 0 P , which coincides with KK(P s P ( )), i.e. 0 P (I) = KK(P s P (I)) for any interpretation I, but does not require any, even intuitive, program transformation like P s P ( ). This may be important in the classical logic programming case where P s P ( ) is not easy to de ne (as does not belong to the language of classical logic programs). Therefore, the set of models deductively closed under support k-completion coincides with the set of xed-points of 0 P , which will be de ned in terms of P only. Informally, given an interpretation I, Essentially, given the current knowledge expressed by I about an intended model of P, we compute rst the support, s P (I), and then cumulate all the implicit knowledge that can be inferred from P, by starting from the support.
It is easy to note that the sequence J I i is monotone non-decreasing under k and, thus has a limit. The following theorem follows directly from Theorems 2.14 and 3.11, and from the Knaster-Tarski theorem. Before proving the last theorem of this section, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.24 Let P be a logic program and let I and K be interpretations. If
Proof. Assume K j= cl P s P (I), i.e. by Lemma 2.16, K = P sP (I) (K) = P (K) s P (I). Therefore, s P (I) k K. We show by induction on i that J I i k K and, thus, at the limit 
The following concluding theorem characterizes the set of models deductively closed under support k-completion in terms of xed-points of 0 P . Theorem 3.25 Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respectively. Then 0 P (I) = KK(P s P (I)).
Proof. The Kripke-Kleene model (for ease denoted K) of P s P (I) under k , is the limit of the sequence
As K j= cl P s P (I), by Lemma 3.24,
, by proving by induction on i that K i k 0 P (I) and, thus, at the limit
(ii) Induction step: suppose K i k 0 P (I). Then, by induction we have We will now state that the set of stable models coincides with the set of models deductively closed under support k-completion. This statement implies that our approach leads to an epistemic characterization of the family of stable models. It also evidences the role of CWA in logic programming. Indeed, CWA can be seen as the additional support of falsehood to be added cumulatively to the Kripke-Kleene semantics to de ne some more informative semantics: the well-founded and the stable model semantics. Moreover, it gives a new xedpoint characterization of that family. Our xed-point characterization is based on P only and neither requires any program transformation nor separation of positive and negative literals/information. The proof of the following stable model characterization theorem can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 3.27 (stable model characterization) Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respectively. The following statements are equivalent:
1. I is a stable model of P;
2. I is a model deductively closed under support k-completion of P, i.e. I = min k (mod cl (P s P (I)));
4. I = KK(P s P (I)).
Considering a classical logic program P, a partial interpretation is a stable model of P if and only if it is deductively closed under its greatest unfounded set completion, i.e. if and only if it coincides with the limit of the sequence:
Finally it is well-known that the least stable model of P w.r.t. k coincides with P's well-founded semantics. Therefore, our approach also provides new characterizations of the well-founded semantics of logic programs over bilattices. Together with Theorem 3.17, we have Corollary 3.28 Let P be a logic program. The following statements are equivalent:
1. I is the well-founded semantics of P;
2. I is the k -least supported model of P, i.e. the k -least xed-point of~ P ;
3. I is the k -least model deductively closed under support k-completion of P, i.e. the k -least xed-point of
Therefore, the well-founded semantics can be characterized by means of the notion of supported models only. Additionally, we now also know why~ P characterizes the well-founded model, while fails in characterizing stable models. Indeed, from I =~ P (I) it follows that I is a model of P s P (I), which does not guarantee that I is the k -least cl-model of P s P (I) (see Example 3.21). Thus, I does not satisfy Theorem 3.20. If I is the k -least xed-point of~ P , then I is both a cl-model of P s P (I) and k -least. Therefore, the k -least supported model is always a model deductively closed under support k-completion as well and, thus a stable model. The following concluding example shows the various ways of computing the well-founded semantics, according to the operators discussed in this study: 0 P and 0 P . But, rather than relying on FOUR as truth space, as we did in our running example, we consider the bilattice of intervals over the unit [0; 1], used frequently for reasoning under uncertainty. The table below shows the computation of the Kripke-Kleene semantics of P,
h0; 1i h0; 1i K 0 h0; 1i h0:3; 1i h0:2; 1i K 1 h0:3; 1i h0:3; 0:8i h0:2; 0:7i K 2 h0:3; 1i h0:3; 0:8i h0:2; 0:7i
Note that knowledge increases during the computation as the intervals become more precise, i.e.
The following table shows us the computation of the well-founded semantics of P, W F (P), as k -least xed-point of Note how the knowledge about falsehood increases as our approximation to the intended model increases, i.e. s P (I i ) k s P (I i+1 ), while the degree of truth decreases (s P (I i+1 ) t s P (I i )). Furthermore, note that W F (P) j= cl P and s P (W F (P)) k W F (P), i.e. W F (P) is a supported model of P, compliant to Corollary 3.28.
Conclusions
Stable model semantics has become a well-established and accepted approach to the management of (non-monotonic) negation in logic programs. In this study we have presented an alternative formulation to the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation, which has widely been used to formulate stable model semantics. Our approach is purely based on algebraic and semantical aspects of informative monotone operators over bilattices. In this sense, we talk about epistemological foundation of the stable model semantics. Our considerations are based on the fact that we regard the closed world assumption as an additional source of falsehood and identify with the support the amount/degree of falsehood carried on by the closed world assumption. The support is the generalization of the notion of the greatest unfounded set for classical logic programs to the context of bilattices. The support is then used to complete the well-known Kripke-Kleene semantics of logic programs. In particular,
1. with respect to well-founded semantics, we have generalized both the xedpoint characterization of the well-founded semantics of [49] to bilattices Table 5 : Well-founded semantics characterization: from classical logic to bilattices.
1.
I is the well-founded semantics of P Classical logic ff; ?; tg Bilattices Table 5 ) and its model-theoretic characterization (Point 3. in Table 5 , see e.g. [30] ).
2. concerning stable model semantics, we have shown that
while previously stable models have been characterized by I 2 stable(P) i I = min t (mod(P I )).
Our result indicates that the support may be seen as the added-value to the Kripke-Kleene semantics and evidences the role of CWA in the well-founded and stable model semantics. It also shows that a separation of positive and negative information is nor necessary (as required by the Gelfond-Lifschitz transform), nor is any program transformation required. As our approach is rather general and abstracts from the underlying logical formalism (in our case logic programs), it may be applied to other contexts as well.
A Proof of Theorem 3.27
This part is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.27. It relies on the following intermediary results. We start by providing lemmas to show that xed-points of 0 P are stable models. Lemma A.1 If I t J and J k I, then I f P (x; I) = I f P (x; J), for any interpretation x.
Proof. Using the antimonotonicity of P w.r.t. t for its second argument, we have I f t P (x; J) t P (x; I). From Lemma 2.2, we have I f P (x; I) k P (x; J). Using the interlacing conditions, we have I f P (x; I) k I f P (x; J). Now, using the monotonicity of P w.r.t. k and the interlacing conditions, we have I f P (x; J) k I f P (x; I). It results that I f P (x; I) = I f P (x; J). Similarly, we have Lemma A.2 If J t I and J k I, then I f P (I; x) = I f P (J; x), for any interpretation x.
Proof. Using the monotonicity of P w.r.t. t for its rst argument, we have I f t P (J; x) t P (I; x). From Lemma 2.2, we have I f P (I; x) k P (J; x). Using the interlacing conditions, we have I f P (I; x) k I f P (J; x). Now, using the monotonicity of P w.r.t. k and the interlacing conditions, we have I f P (J; x) k I f P (I; x). It results that I f P (I; x) = I f P (J; x).
Lemma A.3 If I = P (I) then F I i t s P (I) t I, for all i.
Proof. By Theorem 3.10, the sequence F I i is monotone non-decreasing under t and F I i t s P (I). Now, we show by induction on i that F I i t I and, thus, at the limit s P (I) t I. Lemma A.5 Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respectively. If I is a supported model then s P (I) = I f I.
Proof. By Equation 10 and Theorem 3.15, s P (I) = I f P (I s P (I)) = I f I. (ii) Induction step: let us assume that J 
